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Reward and Uncertainty Favor Risky Decision-Making in Pilots:
Evidence from Cardiovascular and Oculometric Measurements
Mickae¨l Causse • Bruno Baracat • Josette Pastor •
Fre´de´ric Dehais
Abstract In this paper we examined plan continuation
error (PCE), a well known error made by pilots consisting
in continuing the flight plan despite adverse meteorological
conditions. Our hypothesis is that a large range of strong
negative emotional consequences, including those induced
by economic pressure, are associated with the decision to
revise the flight plan and favor PCE. We investigated the
economic hypothesis with a simplified landing task
(reproduction of a real aircraft instrument) in which
uncertainty and reward were manipulated. Heart rate (HR),
heart rate variability (HRV) and eye tracking measure-
ments were performed to get objective clues both on the
cognitive and emotional state of the volunteers. Results
showed that volunteers made more risky decisions under
the influence of the financial incentive, in particular when
uncertainty was high. Psychophysiological examination
showed that HR increased and total HRV decreased in
response to the cognitive load generated by the task. In
addition, HR also increased in response to the financially
motivated condition. Eventually, fixation times increased
when uncertainty was high, confirming the difficulty in
obtaining/interpreting information from the instrument in
this condition. These results support the assumption that
risky-decision making observed in pilots can be, at least
partially, explained by a shift from cold to hot (emotional)
decision-making in response to economic constraints and
uncertainty.
Keywords Heart rate  Heart rate variability  Eye
tracking  Aviation safety  Decision making  Reward
Introduction
51% of accidents occur during arrival whereas this phase
represents only 4% of exposure, i.e. the percentage of flight
time based on flight duration of 1.5 h (Boeing 2005).
A study conducted by MIT (Rhoda and Pawlak 1999) has
demonstrated that in 2,000 cases of approaches under
thunderstorm conditions, two aircrews out of three keep on
landing in spite of adverse meteorological conditions
instead of going-around to perform a new attempt to land
more securely or to divert to another airport. Many
experiments have addressed the difficulty for pilots to
revise their flight plan and several cognitive and psycho-
social explanatory hypotheses have been put forward
(Causse et al. in press; Causse et al. in press; Goh and
Wiegmann 2002; O’ Hare and Smitheram 1995). This
phenomenon is called plan continuation error (PCE) and is
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defined as the ‘‘failure to revise a flight plan despite
emerging evidence that suggests it is no longer safe’’
(Orasanu et al. 2001). In other words, PCE results when the
pilot fails to perceive the changing context of the airspace
and subsequently consider alternate flight plans (McCoy
and Mickunas 2000). The failure to revise a plan is
attributed to overconfidence (Goh and Wiegmann 2001),
tolerance of risk (Pauley et al. 2008), lack of experience
(Burian et al. 2000) or loss of situation awareness (Orasanu
et al. 2001). Another form of explanation for PCE may
reside in the impact of the large range of strong negative
emotional consequences associated with the decision to go-
around. Indeed, a go-around increases the uncertainty and
the level of stress and it may lead to great difficulties to
reinsert the aircraft in the traffic. Moreover, a go-around
has important financial consequences for the airline due to
extra fuel consumption. One now-defunct airline used to
pay passengers one dollar for each minute their flight was
late until a crew attempted to land through a thunderstorm
and crashed (Nance 1986). According to Orasanu (2001),
airlines also emphasize fuel economy and getting passen-
gers to their destinations rather diverting the flight, perhaps
inadvertently sending messages to their pilots concerning
safety versus productivity. Those blurred messages create
conflicting motives, which can affect unconsciously pilots’
risk assessments and the course of action they choose. All
these emotional pressures could alter the rational reasoning
by shifting decision-making constraints from safety rules to
economic ones.
Neuroeconomics studies have explored the effects of
monetary reward/punishment on cognition. Taylor et al.
(2004) highlighted the efficiency of financial incentive to
bias working memory and object recognition and Dreher
et al. (2006) showed that reward speeds up decision-
making. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is
involved in higher cognition, such as reasoning, whereas
the orbitofrontal cortex, which participates in emotional
mechanisms, modulates the anticipation of regret linked to
financial loss (Coricelli et al. 2005). Therefore, reward/
punishment manipulation may interfere both with cogni-
tion and emotion and a parallel could be drawn between
neuroeconomics studies and pilots placed in a conflict sit-
uation between systems of punishment (extra fuel con-
sumption, fatigue caused by a second landing attempt etc.)
and reward (bring passengers without delay). Indeed,
financial reward is associated with neuronal activities in
regions that respond also to emotions and primary rein-
forcers (Elliott et al. 2003).
Today, it is assumed that emotion and stress jeopardize
decision-making relevance and cognitive functioning in
particular in complex tasks (like piloting) that involve the
prefrontal cortex (Dehais et al. 2003; Schoofs et al. 2008).
Emotion is closely linked with rational processing in risk
assessment situation when uncertainty is high (Damasio,
1994). Abelson and Clarke (1963) were the firsts to oppose
reason-based cold cognition to emotionally influenced hot
cognition. Many authors have since confirmed the exis-
tence of a shift from rational cold reasoning to emotional
hot reasoning and its cerebral underpinning has been
demonstrated (Mitchell and Phillips 2007; Drevets and
Raichle 1998). For instance, Goel and Dolan (2003) have
explored the neural network involved in cold reasoning
versus hot reasoning. In their experiment, participants had
to solve syllogisms during an fMRI experiment. Half of the
syllogism verbal content was neutral (cold) whereas the
other half was emotionally salient (hot). Hot reasoning
resulted in enhanced activation in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) whereas cold reasoning resulted in
enhanced activity in DLPFC, highlighting that different
regions are recruited during reasoning according to the
emotional state of participants. Such a cerebral shift may
affect accuracy of decision making and/or reasoning
(Simpson et al. 2001).
The shifting from cold to hot decision-making may be
revealed by changes in the autonomic nervous system
(ANS) activity (Buchanan et al. 2010; Thayer et al. 2009)
and can be measured by heart rate (HR), blood pressure
(Boutcher and Boutcher 2006; Causse et al. 2010; Dehais
et al. 2011; Sosnowski et al. 2004) or heart rate variability
(HRV) (Capa et al. 2008; Duschek et al. 2009; Ryu and
Myung 2005). For instance, Brosschot and Thayer (2003)
found that HR varied during positive and negative affect. It
is worth noticing that increased HR and/or decreased HRV
may be caused by an increased neocortical activity (Backs
1995; Boucsein and Backs 2000).
Flying an aircraft strongly involves visual attention
processes. Since the automation of flight desk, the pilot’s
activity mainly aims at monitoring the embedded systems
and not to control manually the flight itself. It is particu-
larly true during the landing, a highly automated flight
phase, where pilots have to focus on several visual parame-
ters (e.g. altitude, heading) to perform a Go/No-Go deci-
sion-making. Indeed when pilots decide to go-around, the
first major action is to push the throttle to trigger the
automated go-around maneuver. In a second time, the go-
around initiates a missed approach procedure, an optional
flight segment that is depicted in the flight plan (altitude to
reach, heading etc.).
Our hypothesis is that PCE may be, at least in part, due to
a shift from cold reasoning to hot reasoning. This shift may
be the result of the large range of strong negative emotional
consequences linked with the decision to go-around. In this
perspective, hot reasoning is less rational from a safety
point of view and integrates criteria that are oriented toward
company’s financial interest. In this study, we proposed to
investigate this hypothesis with a simplified landing task
inspired by neuroeconomics protocols in which uncertainty
and financial reward were manipulated. Cardiovascular
measurements were performed to get objective clues both of
the cognitive and emotional states of the volunteers. Eye
tracking technique were also used as it provides interesting
insights as the analysis of eye fixations is a reliable indicator
of task complexity or attentional demand (Backs and
Walrath 1992) and is related to the difficulty in obtaining/
interpreting information from an instrument (Wilson and
Eggemeier 1991) whereas the absence of eye gaze on rel-
evant information may suggest environmental mispercep-
tion (Sarter et al. 2007). In addition, eye tracking may
constitute a good clue to understand some particular PCE
(e.g. Controlled Flight Into Terrain accidents) where pilots
keep on landing despite visual ground proximity alarms.
Indeed physiological stress is known to provoke visual
tunneling or cognitive lock up (Bahrick et al. 1952; East-
erbrook 1991; Weltman and Egstrom 1966), phenomenon
that led pilots to neglect critical information.
Methods
Participants
19 young physically and psychiatrically healthy volunteers
were recruited from the local population to participate in
the experiment (mean age = 20.9, SD = 1.59). All par-
ticipants were students in aeronautics and were pilots
(68.42%) or were preparing their flight license (31.58%).
They were all right-handed as measured by the Edinburgh
handedness inventory (Oldfield 1971). Volunteers gave
their informed consent before participation. Volunteers
were paid for participating and were told that they would
earn extra money according to their actions during the task.
Subjects were also told that they would earn only a per-
centage of the amount of money presented on the screen
after each response. For ethical reasons, they all won the
maximum amount of money.
Experimental Paradigm
We used a 2 9 2 factorial design crossing two independent
variables, the type of incentive and the uncertainty. The task
was based on 480 9 480 pixels simplified reproduction of a
real flight instrument, the ILS (Instrument Landing System).
An ILS consists of two independent sub-systems, one pro-
viding lateral guidance (localizer), the other vertical guid-
ance (glide slope or glide path) to aircraft approaching a
runway. This instrument is displayed in the cockpit within
the primary flight display. We used a simplified version of
the primary flight display of an Airbus A320 with only the
ILS (we removed other instrument like airspeed of altitude).
This instrument supports the pilot’s decision-making during
landing without external visibility.
The volunteers were instructed that they were flying a
plane that had reached the decision altitude (the point of
the approach where the pilot must decide if the flight has to
be aborted or not) and that they were allowed to avoid
landing if they believed that landing was unsafe. Decisions
were based on the two elements of the ILS: the localizer
and the glide slope, which provide lateral and vertical
guidance to adjust the trajectory of the aircraft to land on
the runway. The information was given by two rhombuses,
like in real aircraft, displayed below and on the right of the
artificial horizon (Fig. 1). It was reminded to volunteers
that the landing was safe when both rhombuses were close
to the center of their axis and that the farthest from the
center the rhombuses were, the higher was the risk of crash.
They were instructed that rhombuses positions represented
vertical/lateral current position of the aircraft regarding an
ideal approach flight path. During unstabilized approach,
events may be strongly unpredictable and results of actions
cannot be well anticipated. In our study, we reproduced this
uncertainty thanks to the level of ambiguity of information
provided by the instrument. Indeed, stimuli that supported
the landing decision were manipulated according to two
levels of uncertainty: low and high (Fig. 2). This ambiguity
emerged when the rhombuses were in ‘‘fuzzy’’ positions
(i.e. in between a straight go-around and a safe landing).
Such ambiguity generated uncertainty as the feedback
(accuracy and or financial outcome) linked with the deci-
sion was unpredictable. In the landing condition with low
uncertainty, the decision making was straightforward:
Fig. 1 Simplified reproduction of the decision-making environment
during the landing phase. In the upper part, the real environment.
From left to right: the real cockpit, a zoom on the main instrument
with ILS and the throttle. In the bottom part, the experimental
environment. From left to right: the simplified main instrument with
only the two rhombuses of the ILS (in white) and the response pad
that replaced the throttle
either the rhombuses were very far from their respective
center, requiring a go-around (likelihood of successful
landing: 0%), or they were very close, requiring a landing
acceptance (likelihood of successful landing: 100%). In the
landing conditions with high uncertainty, rhombuses had
borderline positions (not very far, not very close from the
center) and the likelihood (unknown by the subjects) of a
successful landing or a crash was 50%. Within a run, there
was no repetition of a same rhombus pattern. These
changes in the level of uncertainty allowed the reduction of
habituation to stimuli and promoted a sustained high level
of reasoning throughout the experiment.
Two types of runs were presented during the experi-
ment, neutral and financial. For each trial, the volunteers
indicated their choice (landing/no landing) by pressing a
button on the response pad. After each response, the par-
ticipants received feedback that informed on the response
accuracy (OK, for a successful landing or a justified
go-around; NO, for an erroneous decision to land or an
unjustified go-around). During the financial incentive
condition, negative emotional consequences associated
with a go-around were reproduced by a payoff matrix
(Fig. 3). This matrix was set up to bias responses in favor
of landing acceptance. A go-around was systematically
punished by a financial penalty. The penalty was less
important (-2€) when the go-around was justified (in the
case where rhombuses were very far from their center) than
when it was unjustified (-5€). This systematic punishment
of the decision to go-around reproduced the systematic
negative consequences associated with this latter in real-
life. A successful landing was rewarded (?5€) whereas an
erroneous decision to land was punished (-2€). The fact
that the erroneous decision to go-around was more
punished than the erroneous decision to land may appear
counterintuitive but the matrix was set up in this way for
two reasons. Firstly, in real-life, pilots know that crash and
overrun are rather unlikely events, whereas the negative
consequences associated with a go-around are systematic.
The analysis of unstabilized approach confirms that acci-
dents are rather rare in spite of frequent risk-taking (Rhoda
and Pawlak 1999). Secondly, introducing very rare events
could have jeopardized physiological and oculometric
measurements. For these reason, we were compelled to
modulate the weight of the punishment rather than its
frequency. At the end of each run, a global feedback
indicated the percentage of correct responses, the ‘‘safety
score’’. Moreover, at the end of the financial run, another
feedback indicated the cumulative amount of money won
or loss, the ‘‘financial score’’. These two scores were in
conflict since the optimization of the ‘‘financial score’’
could only be done at the expense of the safety score as it
necessarily implies a dangerous increase of the landing
acceptance rate. Eventually, volunteers were explained
that, as in real life, taking into account the flight safety was
essential in this experiment.
Stimuli Presentation
Stimulus display and data acquisition were done with
Cogent 2000 v125 running under Matlab environment
(Matlab 7.2.0.232, R2006a, The MathWorks, USA). Each
trial (see Fig. 4) consisted in a presentation of the stimulus
(3.5 s) during which the volunteer performed the decision-
making thanks to a response pad, followed after a delay
(10 s) by the feedback informing of the accuracy of the
response (0.5 s). During the incentive condition, the
financial outcome was also displayed ({?5€}, {-5€} or
{-2€}). Finally, an inter trial interval (10 s) was intro-
duced. Before the experiment, volunteers performed two
runs (neutral and financial) to become familiar with the
task and the payoff matrix.
Cardiovascular Measurements
Volunteers were comfortably installed and tested in a
moderately lit room, in which the illumination was held
constant (background luminance: about 450 lux). The Pro-
Comp Infiniti (ÓThought Technology Ltd.) was used to
continuously record the cardiovascular activity. It was
measured using the EKG-Flex/Pro sensor (2,048 Hz). Three
electrodes connected to an extender cable were applied on
the volunteer’s chest. A Uni-Gel electrode was used to
enhance the quality of the signal. This latter was measured
in microvolts (lV) and beat to beat intervals were converted
to beats per minute (bpm). Frequency domain measures of
HRV were quantified through fast Fourier transform and
Fig. 2 Categorization of the level of uncertainty according to a score,
between 0 and 29, calculated from the rhombus positions. The
position were counterbalanced to avoid laterality effects. The order of
presentation of the stimuli was randomized
Fig. 3 The feedbacks displayed after each decision making. Without
incentive, only the accuracy feedback was delivered (OK/NO), with
financial incentive, the monetary consequences were also displayed
after the accuracy feedback
included the two main frequency bands, low-frequency
power (LF, 0.03–0.15 Hz), high-frequency power (HF,
0.15–0.40 Hz) plus the very low frequency power (VLF,
0.03 Hz) and total HRV (Task Force 1996). Whereas HF
frequency is known to be triggered by vagal influences, LF
frequency seems dependent on a mixture of orthosympa-
thetic and parasympathetic activity (Backs 1998). We
reported absolute values for each component (natural log-
arithm of HRV amplitude, ms2). Because no groups were
created in our study, normalized units were not computed.
Oculometric Measurements
A Pertech head-mounted eye-tracker (type ‘‘pair of glas-
ses’’) was used to analyze the volunteers’ ocular behavior. It
is equipped with a monocular sensor (left eye, 50 Hz) and a
scene camera. Determination of gaze direction is based on
pupil orientation detection: a calibration step allows cor-
relating images of both cameras to determine precisely the
eye fixations points. The device has 0.25° of accuracy and it
weights 80 g which makes it likely non-intrusive for the
subjects during the experimentation. A dedicated software
(EyeTechLabÓ) provides data such as timestamps and the
(x,y) coordinates of the volunteers’ eye gaze on the visual
scene. Fixation times on the rhombuses of the ILS were
considered thanks to area of interest analysis.
Results
Statistical Analysis
Behavioral Data
All behavioral data were analyzed with Statistica 7.1 (Ó
StatSoft). Mean reaction times (RTs) and response bias
were calculated for each experimental condition. The use
of response bias as variable was inspired from Taylor et al.
(2004) study which also intended to measure behavioral
shift in response to a biased payoff matrix. In our study, a
negative response bias would correspond to a conservative
behavior (lower percentage of landing acceptance than
objectively expected) whereas a positive response bias
would correspond to a risky behavior (higher percentage of
landing acceptance than objectively expected). For
instance, 65% of landing acceptance during the 50%
stimuli gives a ?15% response bias (65–50) concerning
high uncertainty condition whereas 15% of landing
acceptance during 0% stimuli and 100% of landing
acceptance during 100% stimuli give a ?7.5% response
bias concerning low uncertainty condition (((0 ? 15) ?
(100–100))/2). This response bias was calculated for each
of the four experimental conditions. The effects of uncer-
tainty, of the type of incentive and their interactions on RT
and the response bias were examined using to two-way 2 *
2 (type of incentive * level of uncertainty) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. Tukey’s honestly significant difference
post-hoc test was used to examine paired comparisons.
Cardiovascular and Oculometric Data
Mean heart rate was computed during the whole duration
of three periods of interest: the baseline and the two types
of runs, neutral and financial. A one-way repeated measure
(baseline/neutral/financial) ANOVA was performed to
assess the significance of HR changes across these three
periods and Tukey’s honestly significant difference post
hoc test was used to examine paired comparisons. The
same type of data analysis was performed on HRV values.
We then examined the effect of the type of incentive, the
level of uncertainty and their interactions on the heart rate
during shorter time windows. Mean values were computed
Fig. 4 Illustration of the stimuli
presentation during the two
types of experimental runs:
financial and neutral
in the time window between the stimulus onset and 10 s
post-stimulus onset. This time window was set up
according to the cardiac response latency (Vila et al. 2007).
Mean values of these stimulus locked data were submitted
to two-way 2 9 2 (type of incentive * level of uncertainty)
repeated-measures ANOVA to examine the effect of the
level of uncertainty, the type of incentive and their inter-
actions on the HR. Oculometric data were considered
during the stimuli duration (2.5 s) and a two-way (incen-
tive * uncertainty) repeated measures ANOVA was also
performed. Stimulus-locked analyses were not performed
on HRV because this requires a longer period of recording.
For instance, Berntson et al. (2007) indicate that a mini-
mum of 10 cycles is required to perform fast Fourier
transform, in consequence only type of incentive effect was
considered for HRV.
Behavioral Results
Tables 1 and 2 summarize behavioral data and main
ANOVA results. Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a
main effect of uncertainty on RTs (p\ .001, F(1,18) =
56.65, g2p = .76). High uncertainty generated longer mean
RTs than low uncertainty stimuli. In addition, the ANOVA
revealed a main effect of the type of incentive on the RTs
(p = .001, F(1,18) = 16.79, g2p = .52). During the finan-
cial condition, RTs were shorter than during the neutral
condition, see Fig. 5. The analysis of the interactions
between the level of uncertainty and the type of incentive did
not show significant results (p = .096, F(1,15) = 3.101,
g
2p = .15).
The mean total outcome was high (?39.31€, SD =
11.42). It confirmed that the reward oriented decision
making toward economic optimization, as a decision that
would have been only oriented toward safety (systematic
go-around in case of uncertainty) would have led volun-
teers to a negative outcome (-70€). The ANOVA showed
that there was a main effect of the uncertainty (p\ .001,
F(1,18) = 21.81, g2p = .54) and a main effect of the
incentive (p\ .001, F(1,18) = 94.49, g2p = .83) on the
magnitude of the response bias. In addition, the ANOVA
also revealed an interaction effect between these two
variables (p = .013, F(1,18) = 7.50, g2p = .29): the
financial incentive provoked an increase of the likelihood
to accept a landing and this increase was higher when the
uncertainty was elevated. Concerning the financial incen-
tive condition, the response bias shifts from ?2.89% when
the uncertainty was low, to ?32.36% when the uncertainty
was high (p\ .001), see Fig. 6.
Cardiovascular Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize cardiovascular data and main
ANOVA results. The analysis revealed that the HR was
significantly different across the three periods (p\ .001,
F(2.36) = 14.88 g2p = .49), see Fig. 7. The HSD post-hoc
test demonstrated that the mean HR was higher during the
two runs than during the baseline (p\ .001 in both
Table 1 Average value and standard deviation using behavioral variables according to the level of uncertainty and the type of incentive
(N = 19)
Neutral Financial
Low uncertainty High uncertainty Low uncertainty High uncertainty
TR (ms) 1,334.83 ± 177.70 1,561.16 ± 177.97 1,270.89 ± 174.77 1,407.39 ± 163.43
Bias (%) -4.73 ± 5.39 12.36 ± 18.66 2.89 ± 5.08 32.36 ± 12.62
Table 2 Main ANOVA results and interactions (* p B .05; *** p B .001) using behavioral variables according to the level of uncertainty and
the type of incentive (N = 19)
Effect df F MSE p g2p
RT
Uncertainty 1.18 56.65 10,524 \.001*** .76
Incentive 1.18 18.79 11,861 \.001*** .52
Uncertainty 9 Incentive 1.18 3.101 11,413 \.096 .15
Response bias
Uncertainty 1.18 21.81 166.23 \.001*** .54
Incentive 1.18 94.49 109.06 \.001*** .83
Uncertainty 9 Incentive 1.18 7.50 96.78 .013* .29
comparisons). In addition, HSD post-hoc test showed an
effect of the type of incentive: the mean HR was higher
during the run with financial incentive than the neutral one
(p = .018). Newman-Keuls method confirmed this out-
come and classified the baseline, the neutral run and the
financial run as three independent homogeneous groups.
The mean HR was 70.15 bpm (SD = 7.63) during the
baseline, 71.94 bpm (SD = 5.88) during the neutral run
and 74.04 bpm (SD = 6.39) during the financial run. A
separate 2 9 2 ANOVA performed on stimuli locked data
showed no effect of the uncertainty but confirmed that HR
was higher when the decision-making was performed under
the financial pressure than during the neutral condition
(p\ .023, F(1.18) = 5.57 g2p = .29).
We then examined the HRV variations (VLF, LF, HF
and total HRV) across the three periods of interest. The
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main
effect of the period of interest on VLF (p = .046,
F(2,36) = 3.30, g2p = .18), LF (p = .023, F(2,36) =
4.24, g2p = .22), HF (p = .050, F(2,36) = 2.91, g2p = .16)
and on the total HRV (p\ .001, F(2,60) = 5.47, g2p =
.26), see Fig. 8. Paired comparisons showed that VLF, LF,
HF and total HRV were lower during neutral run and
financial run than during rest state (respectively p = .034 &
p = .032; p = .017 and p = .016; p = .042 and p = .048;
p = .007 and p = .007). Contrary to HR, there was no
effect of the type of incentive on HRV variables.
Eye Tracking Results
Tables 5 and 6 summarize eye tracking data and main 2 9 2
ANOVA results. Therewas a significant effect of uncertainty
on the fixation time (p\ .001,F(1,18) = 1,109, g2p = .98),
see Fig. 9. The stimuli with a high level of ambiguity gen-
erated a strong increase of the time spent analyzing the
rhombuses positions in comparison to the stimuli with low
ambiguity. There was nomain effect of the type of incentive.
Discussion
Our experiment was designed to understand pilots’ trend to
land despite bad landing conditions. We investigated the
impact of an economic pressure, namely the cost of a go-
around, on risk taking during a plausible landing-decision
situation. In this experiment, both uncertainty and type of
incentive were manipulated. Our assumption was that
pilots frame their decision to keep on landing in terms of
potential losses, such as money spent of fuel consumption
(O’ Hare and Smitheram 1995). Indeed, an airline that
emphasizes productivity (e.g. on time arrivals or saving
fuel) may unconsciously set up conflicts with safety. Pilots
may be willing to take a risk with safety (a possible loss) to
arrive on time (a sure benefit). Our behavioral, physio-
logical and oculometric results tend to confirm that the
risky decision to land in pilots may be explained by deci-
sion-making criteria shifting. Cold reasoning appeared to
be more analytic and objective whereas hot reasoning was
associated with a search for reward at the expense of
safety.
On one hand, longer RTs and greater fixation times
suggest that in the high uncertainty condition, the task was
very demanding and required further analysis of the stimuli.
Longer fixations times are generally believed to be an
Fig. 5 Reaction time (ms) according to the level of uncertainty and
the type of incentive. Bars represent the standard error (N = 19)
Fig. 6 Response bias (%) according to the level of uncertainty and
the type of incentive. A positive response bias demonstrated a landing
acceptance beyond the objective expectancies (for instance, 55% of
landing acceptance during the high uncertainty condition with
financial incentive gives a 5% response bias). Bars represent the
standard error (N = 19)
indication of a participant’s difficulty extracting information
from a display (Goldberg and Kotval 1999; Wilson and
Eggemeier 1991; Fitts et al. 1950). On the other hand, it is
interesting to note that when high uncertainty condition was
Table 3 Average value and standard deviation using cardiovascular variables according to the level of uncertainty and the type of incentive
(N = 19)
Rest Neutral Financial
Low uncertainty High uncertainty Low uncertainty High uncertainty
HR (bpm) 70.15 ± 7.63 72.06 ± 5.42 72.32 ± 6.05 73.989 ± 6.89 74.09 ± 6.29
VLF (ms2) 268.70 ± 407.50 144.69 ± 151.15 146.21 ± 156.44
LF (ms2) 545.43 ± 536.38 315.22 ± 311.28 314.45 ± 299.30
HF (ms2) 471.79 ± 439.50 262.29 ± 311.45 268.495 ± 378.95
Total HRV (ms2) 1,285.93 ± 1,243.98 723.73 ± 692.86 727.64 ± 760.91
Table 4 Main ANOVA results, interactions and Tukey’s HSD post hoc (* p B .05; *** p B .001) using cardiovascular variables according to
the period, the level of uncertainty and the type of incentive (N = 19)
Effect df F MSE p g2p Tukey’s HSD
HR
Period 2.36 14.88 4 \.001*** .49 Neutral & Financial[Baseline; Financial[Neutral
Uncertainty 1.18 0.95 1.1 .343 .06
Incentive 1.18 6.32 5.70 .023* .29
Uncertainty 9 Incentive 1.18 0 0.9 .95 .00
VLF
Period 2.36 3.30 24.504 .046* .18 Neutral & Financial[Baseline
LF
Period 2.36 4.24 66.732 .023* .22 Neutral & Financial[Baseline
HF
Period 2.36 2.91 77.961 .050* .16 Neutral & Financial[Baseline
Total HRV
Period 2.36 5.47 305.646 \.001*** .26 Neutral & Financial[Baseline
Fig. 7 Mean heart rate (bpm) across the three periods of interest: at
rest (baseline), and during the neutral run and the financial run. The
HR was significantly lower during the baseline than the two runs and
was more elevated during the financial run than the neutral one
(* p B .05; *** p B .001). These results showed an effect of the
mental load generated by the task (for both types of runs) and an
effect of the type of incentive. Bars represent the standard error
(N = 19)
Fig. 8 Mean total HRV (ms2) across the three periods of interest: at
rest (baseline), the neutral run and the financial run. The total HRV
was significantly lower during the two runs than during the baseline,
showing an effect of the mental load generated by the task (for both
types of runs) (*** p B .001). Bars represent the standard error
(N = 19)
combined with the financial pressure, the volunteers showed
a shift toward hot reasoning. Firstly, compared to the neutral
condition, RTs were dramatically reduced, which suggest a
lower depth of reasoning before reaching decision-making
in presence of the financial incentive. Secondly, the volun-
teers clearly changed their response criteria in favor of
economic optimization as they made more risky decisions to
avoid the risk of a penalty in the case of a go-around. As a
matter of fact, this behavior led the volunteers to more
crashes. Interestingly, this shift could be conscious as this
risky decision-making occurred in spite of a proper analysis
of the situation, at least from a quantitative point of view, as
the time spent on the rhombuses at the time of the decision-
making was equivalent with or without the financial
incentive. This gaze pattern shows that PCE can result from
a less rational reasoning in response to conflicting motives
created by the financial pressure and helps to understand
some particular PCE that led to Controlled Flight Into
Terrain accidents (CFIT), where pilots kept on landing
despite visual ground proximity alarms (Dehais et al. 2003).
Decision making under uncertainty and time pressure is
widely studied in aviation safety. In real flight operation, the
crew has to face several hazards as failures are likely to
occur and weather conditions (wind, visibility, icing con-
ditions) may quickly evolved in an unpredicted way. Most
of the time, go-around is taken under a high uncertainty as
this situation is quite rare and the pilot lack of experience
and preprogrammed knowledge. We simulated uncertainty
thanks to the level of ambiguity of information provided by
the ILS instrument. We assume that our landing task was a
very simplified situation compared to real flight conditions
that are much more complex in terms of information pro-
cessing. Nevertheless the analysis of the physiological
responses showed that the task has generated notable energy
mobilization and psychological stress as the mean HR was
significantly higher during task in comparison to the resting
state (Boutcher and Boutcher 2006; Causse et al. 2010;
Sosnowski et al. 2004). In the same way, the fall of the total
HRV during both runs in comparison to rest state is coherent
with an increased mental workload (Ryu and Myung 2005;
Thayer et al. 2009).
Again, though the economical consequences of this task
had nothing to compare with real flight issues, the payoff
matrix designed to reproduce the negative consequences
linkedwith the decision to go-aroundwas efficient enough to
provoke risky behavior such as PCE. Indeed, it has incited
volunteers to maximize their monetary reward and biased
their response criterion from safety to economic consider-
ations in spite of the fact that all participants were told that as
in real life, taking into account the flight safety was essential
in this experiment.Whole run analyses showed that themean
HR was higher in the financially motivated condition than in
the neutral condition. Although the magnitude of the change
between the two runs was moderate (2.10 bpm), it was
Table 5 Average value and standard deviation using oculometric variable according to the level of uncertainty and the type of incentive
(N = 19)
Neutral Financial
Low uncertainty High uncertainty Low uncertainty High uncertainty
Fixation times (s) 0.87 ± 0.14 1.92 ± 0.23 0.82 ± 0.17 1.76 ± 0.35
Table 6 Main ANOVA results and interactions (*** p B .001) using oculometric variable according to the level of uncertainty and the type of
incentive (N = 19)
Effect df F MSE p g2p
Fixations times
Uncertainty 1.18 1.58 0.07 \.001*** .98
Incentive 1.18 1,338.70 0.01 .662 .01
Uncertainty 9 Incentive 1.18 1.83 0.01 .194 .10
Fig. 9 Fixation time (sec) according to the level of uncertainty and
the type of incentive. Bars represent the standard error (N = 19)
nevertheless very significant and persistent on all partici-
pants. It should be noticed that the magnitude of this
increase is consistent with the literature related to emotion
induction in laboratory (Baumgartner et al. 2006; Brosschot
and Thayer 2003). For instance, Brosschot (2003) showed
that negative and positive emotion induction = elicited
respectively anHR rise of 2.14 and 1.06 bpm. This increased
HR, well known to occur in real-life gamblers (Meyer et al.
2000), demonstrated that the financial incentive has pro-
voked an emotional arousal. We initially hypothesized that
financial incentive will induced a shift from cold to hot
reasoning in our volunteers, where hot reasoning refers to
emotional processing and cold reasoning relied on cognitive
processing (Goel and Dolan 2003; Schaefer et al. 2003). As
these studies have indicated that emotional processing acti-
vates VMPFC and that increased heart rate in an indication
of VMPFC recruitment (Ziegler et al. 2009) we assume that
this shift effectively occurred. A final interesting point was
that HR appeared to be more sensitive to a moderate emo-
tional arousal as HRV was not impacted by the type of
incentive (neutral or financial). It also suggests that the
autonomic activity can be differentially affected by central
stimulation and in a much more complex way than a
monolithic activation reflecting and increased arousal. In
this sense, a study of McCraty et al. (1995) showed that HR
and HRV variations can be independent during the experi-
ence of anger and appreciation. These outcomes confirm the
importance of using several sensors to monitor emotional or
cognitive state of operators like pilots (Veltman 2002; Yao
et al. 2008; Dahlstrom and Nahlinder 2006). As long as the
operator is a key agent in charge of complex systems, the
choice of relevant measurements able to predict his perfor-
mance in order to provide real-time assistance is a great
challenge. For instance, HRmeasurement could be a reliable
indication of the experience of a deleterious emotion and
gives the opportunity to react quickly with countermeasures
(e.g. a simple informative message with actions to perform)
before reaching an irreversible situation. In the same way,
gaze-tracking could be used to detect that some critical
information (e.g. alarm) are difficult to interpret or neglec-
ted. We reproduced the same experiment in fMRI with 15
volunteers in order to examine the brain regions involved in
the shift from cold to hot reasoning. Preliminary results are
consistent with this study: we observed an increase of risky
decision in presence of the monetary incentive when
uncertainty is high.Moreover, the financial incentive and the
uncertainty enhanced the activity of ‘‘emotional’’ neural
pathways and modulated visual areas recruitment (Causse
et al. 2009).
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